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Klaus Krippendorff 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
The Science and Praxis of  Complexity. Contributions to the Symposium Held at 
Montpellier, France, May 9-11, 1984. Tokyo: United Nations University, 1985. 
Distributed by Unipub, New York. viii + 384 pages. $25.00 (soft). 
 
 In May of 1984, in a symposium sponsored by the United Nations University, 37 scholars 
and practitioners from all over the world met in Montpellier, France, to discuss what seemed to be 
a common and increasingly pressing problem: complexity. The list of participants is impressive, 
including K. Boulding, T. Hagerstrand, H. Henderson, N. Luhmann, R. Margalef, E. Morin, K. 
Pribram, I. Prigogine, and H. von Foerster, to name a few. The 384 pages of this volume contain 
most of their contributions, organized in five sections: understanding complexity, complexity in 
focus, complexity in nature, complexity in society, and overviews. 
 
 An initial reading seems to suggest little commonality among these contributions. Boulding 
writes about knowledge and what we have not managed to understand. Le Moigne is concerned 
with the vicious circle in which human intelligence creates complexity and complexity requires 
human intelligence to be understood. Luhmann suggests that complexity is to the natural sciences 
as meaning is to the humanities and the social sciences, sharing some of the same difficulties of 
understanding. Atlan amplifies the difference between natural complexity and the self-creation of 
meaning, and Dupuy contrasts autonomy with complexity in society. Predictably, Prigogine and 
Allen link the emergence of complexity to dissipative structures, while Pribram links it to brain 
activity (holography in particular). Holling and Margalef consider the complexity of ecological 
systems, to which Aida wants to see technology added. The economist Giarini approaches the 
concept from the point of view of the vulnerability of economic systems leading to policy, 
management, and methodological considerations, which are addressed in papers by Voge, Kirby, 
Malaska and Klir, and many more. Zeleny gives a good account of the history of some of the 
pertinent concepts, and Chapman writes the overview. This multiplicity is inviting to readers but 
defies detailed review. Let me therefore focus on just three common threads. 
 
 The first is epistemology. Boulding's contribution starts with a revealing statement 
claiming that "complexity is a very complex problem"; this is echoed later by Ploman, who 
suggests that "the subject of complexity is ... a prime example of complexity." These make 
complexity a second order concept, one that can be applied onto itself like the meaning of meaning 
(Luhmann, after Ogden and Richards' famous book), the computation of computation (Le Moigne, 
quoting von Foerster), information about information, etc. It suggests that complexity is not 
entirely rooted in properties of the real world but is very much a creation of the human observer, 
who cannot but recursively operate in language; and, indeed, many contributions link the concept 
to difficulties of human cognition in understanding a phenomenon, solving a problem, or managing 
something difficult to know in detail: ultimately, to be conscious of oneself. In these contributions 
complexity is no longer the property of an object, independent of an observer, but arises in 
processes of interaction between the two. This shift from things to cognitive processes is one 
motivation to talk about the possibility of a new science of complexity in which epistemological 
problems are integral to research. 
 
 The second thread is the abstract nature of the domain. Traditionally, academic disciplines 
have specialized in object areas (e.g., physics is concerned with matter, biology with living 
organisms, and sociology with social organization) or in approaches to problems (e.g., psychology 
aims at knowledge and healing). From this vantage point it sometimes reads like animism when 
the conference contributors claim that "complexity threatens" or write about "research into 
complexity," "managing complexity," etc. However, on a second reading of the book, there seems 
to be an emerging consensus that complexity need not be treated as a mere attribute of some object 
of investigation (e.g., "the complexity of an economic system" or "complex" versus "simple" 
explanations) but rather indicates problems that are widely shared across disciplines. This idea, 
while challenging the traditional academic classifications, is not without historical precedence. 
Syntax, systems, and (last but not least) communication have similar empirical grounds in that the 
phenomena cannot be experienced without a material base but can be studied without reference to 
it. 
 
 The third common thread is the role of information theory. In reading these papers, one is 
struck by the extent to which experts from so many fields use the language of Shannon's 
information theory. The close connection between information theory and thermodynamics, 
linking the social sciences, including psychology and economics, with ecology, biology, and 
physics, may be one reason. Another is that it can be measured in a great many processes and 
regardless of their particular material forms. But probably the most important reason is that 
information is defined in terms of decision making and is naturally tied to the management of 
complexity (see H. Simon's famous "The Architecture of Complexity"), thus providing at least one 
common approach to complexity. To be fair, not everyone uses information in Shannon's technical 
sense. The biophysicist Atlan also makes use of Kolmogoroff’s algorithmic approach; the 
sociologist Luhmann extends it to the selectivity of meaning. Others refer to different levels of 
description, but virtually everyone uses notions originally found in information theory.  
 
 While notions of information, communication, circular networks, and organization 
increasingly become the rallying concepts of scholars from a variety of backgrounds, be it under 
the umbrella of systems theory, cybernetics, cognitive science, or, in this case, a (not yet 
established) science of complexity, it is surprising that communication scholars are virtually absent 
in such endeavors. Could it be that communication researchers have limited themselves to a 
restrictive vocabulary and repertoire of models, involving people as senders and receivers, through 
which higher-order structures are not recognizable? Could it be that communication researchers 
have surrendered to technological determinism by studying attitude change, persuasion, social 
stratification, and media uses all in response to the unquestioned existence of communication 
technology? Could it be that the adoption of epistemologically inadequate paradigms prevents 
communication scholars from understanding information and meaning as socially constructing the 
complex realities we communicate with and manage? 
 
 The book is unquestionably stimulating. Readers will have to find their own answers to 
why and what they are doing as communication scholars and how complexity interacts with their 
lives. 
